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Abstract
During a natural disaster, the negative supply shock due to the destruction of productive capacity is coun-
teracted by a positive demand shock due to public grants for assistance and reconstruction, positing an
identification issue in empirical work. Focusing on the 2009 ’Aquilano’ earthquake in Italy as a case study,
we take advantage of quantified measure of damages for 75,424 buildings to estimate the negative supply
shock and of a law issued to allocate reconstruction grants, which resulted in a sharp, exogenous discon-
tinuity in transfers and output behavior across neighboring municipalities to estimate the positive demand
shock. Diﬀ-in-diﬀ analysis suggests that local output multipliers of reconstruction grants (net of marginal
tax rebates) are below unity. Yet the size of the grants act as a public insurance scheme, preventing a fall in
output.
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1 Introduction
Concerns over containing or reducing the potential negative eﬀects on economic activity generated by
earthquakes have been an important driver of policy and academic debates in recent years. However, despite
earthquakes create disarray in large sectors of the local economy, there is still little or no consensus on their
impact on economic activity: previuos papers have reached opposing conclusions on how disasters aﬀect local
output and employment. Furthermore, because of the nature of such natural events (earthquakes are rare
and counterfactuals are often absent) there remains uncertainty over the multiplicative eﬀects on output
of public grants for assistance and reconstruction. While recent work on local fiscal multipliers (reviewed
below) suggests that the elasticity of output to public grants is positive and above unity, an open question
is whether the eﬀectiveness of public intervention applies also to situations of profound stress, such as those
characterizing the aftermath of a natural disaster.
Focusing on the ’Aquilano’ earthquake that hit the Italian region of ’Abruzzo’ in 2009, in this paper
we estimate the output eﬀect generated by the event, as a result of two combined shocks, the negative
supply shock due to the quake, and the positive demand shock driven by reconstruction grants to the region.
Our empirical strategy relies on the following two factors: (i) a quantified measure of damages reported
by the 75,424 buildings classified after the quake, and (ii) the specific characteristics of the institutional
arrangement of public grants providing insurance to the municipalities aﬀected by the event. With regard to
the first factor, in the aftermath of the earthquake specialists from the Civil Protection Department (CPD)1
and the National Institute of Geophysics and Vulcanology (INGV ) visited the epicentral area with the goal
of surveying the aﬀected buildings. Relying on the reported damages, we construct a synthetic index that
captures the negative supply shock generated by the event at the micro-municipal level. With regard to the
second factor, as a complementary task the delegates assigned a synthetic number to the municipalities in the
epicentral area reflecting the overall severity of the damages. Following a well-established practice, the ranking
was based on the so-called Mercalli scale that classifies the destructive eﬀects of an earthquake on twelve
1The Department of Civil Protection is a structure of the Prime Minister’s Oﬃce which coordinates and directs the national
service of civil protection. When a national emergency is declared, it coordinates the relief on the entire national territory. It
coordinates activities in response to natural disasters, catastrophes or other events which, due to their intensity and extent, must
be tackled using special means and powers. In this case, the council of ministers declares the ’state of emergency’ by issuing a
law by decree and identifies the actions to be undertaken to manage the event.
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notches, ranging from ’instrumental’ (I) to ’catastrophic’ (XII).2 Once the list of aﬀected municipalities was
delivered to the national authorities, the central government enacted a law by decree establishing a qualifying
Mercalli threshold for reconstruction grants. This threshold, ex ante unknown to the delegates, was fixed
at level VI of the scale (the lowest level associated to marginal damages to civil structures) and resulted in
a sharp discontinuity in grants across ex ante identical neighbor municipalities. The assigned grants were
then used by the qualified municipalities for two purposes: to finance the increase of local spending directed
towards reconstruction activities and to compensate for the loss in local tax revenues due to the tax base
shock and the suspension of tax payments in the most aﬀected regions.
Studying the 305 municipalities in the Abruzzo region over the period 2002 to 2011 (3,050 observations
in total) we estimate three things. First, we estimate the output loss generated by the negative supply
shock due to the destruction of physical capital relying on our index of damages. Second, we estimate
the ’grants multiplier’ - the elasticity of local output to exogenous reconstruction grants allocated from the
central government to the qualified municipalities. Third, noticing that the discontinuity in local spending
is identified at Mercalli VI as for grants while the discontinuity in local tax revenues is at Mercalli VII (due
to an exogenous reduction in the local marginal tax rate which applied only to municipalities with severe
damages), we estimate the ’local spending multiplier’ net of marginal tax rebates around the Mercalli VI
cutoﬀ and the the ’local tax multiplier’ net of variations of the tax base around the Mercalli VII cutoﬀ.
In our econometric analysis we rely on two identification strategies based on a linear fixed-eﬀects panel
data model. In the first identification strategy in order to address the grants endogeneity issue we rely
on a diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences approach regressing output over the index of damages and the interaction
between a dummy which identifies the treatment and control groups (around the Mercalli VI cutoﬀ) and
the per capita grants. The second identification strategy addresses the possible endogeneity of damages
using an instrumental variable approach. As a strictly exogenous instrument we employ the distance of each
municipality from the epicenter which confirms the prior to be highly correlated with the recorded damages
and fully satisfies the exclusion restriction criteria.
2Contrary to the well-known Richter scale (which quantifies the moment magnitude of an earthquake meaning the energy
released by the event), the Mercalli scale classifies the destructive eﬀects of an earthquake. While every quake has only one
magnitude recorded at the epicenter, the destructive eﬀects (therefore the Mercalli ranks) vary greatly across municipalities
according to a large set of factors, including the distance from the epicenter or the ex ante vulnerability of buildings. See for C
details.
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In our findings, the direct eﬀect of the earthquake on output is unambiguously negative. Our instru-
mental variables analysis shows that, on impact, the output loss from the quake averages 3.7 percentage
points. Against the output eﬀects of the negative supply shock, we document positive multiplicative eﬀects
of reconstruction grants. The estimated ’grants multiplier’ is bounded between 0.14 and 0.36 according to
the model. Multiplying these elasticities by the magnitude of the fiscal shock, our results suggest that public
grants compensate the output fall (which is instead suﬀered by the control group) generated by the quake.
Therefore, although grants multipliers remain well below unity in all models, our results suggest that fol-
lowing seismic events reconstruction grants provide public insurance. Output in uninsured regions contracts
while it expands, although marginally, in qualified municipalities. Also, the ’local spending multiplier’ net
of marginal tax rebates is virtually identical to the ’grants multiplier’ signaling, as expected, that most of
the exogenous variations in grants financed reconstruction activities and translated into a sharp increase of
local spending. On the other hand, the ’local tax multiplier’ is well above unity with point estimate of 2.56
even if this last estimate should be interpreted with caution given the restricted number of observations in
the corresponding treatment group (above Mercalli VII).
Our findings contribute to two strands of the literature, one assessing the macroeconomic implications of
natural disasters, and the other one on local fiscal multipliers. Regarding the first one, some authors argue
that earthquakes are setbacks for economic growth (Noy [2009]), while others, like Loayza et al. [2012] find
that they might activate a creative destruction process even in the short-run.3 Regarding the second one, a
small but dynamic literature has produced estimates on local output elasticities to exogenous fiscal shocks
using diﬀerent instruments: dismissal of elected oﬃcials (Acconcia et al. [2011]), census revisions (Serrato and
Wingender [2011]), variations in ARRA stimulus outlays (Chodorow-Reich et al. [2012]), or military buildups
across US states (Nakamura and Steinsson [2011]). Close in spirit to our paper is a recent contribution by
Corbi et al. who rely on a discontinuity in federal transfers to municipal governments in Brazil to identify
the causal eﬀect of fiscal policy on economic growth. Our estimates are lower than those reported in the
aforementioned contributions. While output elasticity to fiscal shocks is predicted to be higher in downturns
(Woodford [2011]), the grants (and spending) multipliers contained in this paper remain well below unity
in all models. Although the marginal utility of public spending in the aftermath of a seismic event is high
3For a review of this literature see Cavallo and Noy [2009].
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because the level of spending is below optimality, we think that the main explanation of such low multipliers
might be related to the ineﬃcient use of public funds due to cases of corruption well documented by the
dozens of public oﬃcials and business men arrested or persecuted following the reconstruction activities.4
Furthermore, to our knowledge the estimate of the ’local tax multipliers’ is the first one in the literature so
far opening the ground for future research.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the 2009 ’Aquilano’ earthquake, the
natural event at the heart of this study. Section 3 explains and discusses the empirical models. Section 4
describes the main features of our dataset. Section 5 discusses our main results. Section 6 is devoted to the
discussion of our set of robustness checks. Section 7 concludes. Additional tables, charts, and complementary
results are reported in Appendix A to F.
2 The 2009 ’Aquilano’ earthquake
At 03:32 am on April 6th 2009 a 6.3 magnitude earthquake hit the southern part of Italy. The epicenter
was located 19.79 Kilometers to the west of ’L’Aquila’, the capital city of Abruzzo region.5 Three hundred
and nine people were killed and more than 1,500 were injured. The seismic event generated damages in
97 municipalities, 72 of which located in the province of L’Aquila. Following the declaration of the state
of emergency by the Council of Ministers (April 6th, 2009), a team of specialists from the Civil Protection
Department (CPD) and the National Institute of Geophysics and Vulcanology (INGV ) visited the aﬀected
regions to assess the severity and extension of the damages. The procedure lasted ten days and on April 16th
the list of aﬀected municipalities and the estimate of total damages was made publicly available and sent to
the central government.
During their mission the delegates had two separate tasks. First, they visited each building reporting
damages (or suspected so) and ranked them following the ’AeDES international classification system’ (Baggio
et al. [2007]). This system categorizes civil structures after a seismic event on six levels ranging from ’A’
(’usable building’) to ’F’ (’unusable building and severe external risks’).6 Table 1 shows the distribution of
4The exact number of people either arrested of formally persecuted is unknown at the moment because investigations are
still underway.
5Abruzzo is a southern region of Italy composed by 305 municipalities grouped in 4 provinces (L’Aquila, Chieti, Teramo, and
Pescara) for a total 1.3 million inhabitants. See figure 11.
6The six categories are defined as follows: A: ’usable building’; B: ’usable building after short-term measures’; C: ’partially
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Table 1: Percentage of buildings in each AeDES category.
Type of building
AeDES category Private Public Hospitals Barracks Schools Factories Overall
A 55.0 57.5 51.5 71.0 52.9 56.6 55.2
B 15.6 19.1 18.2 25.0 26.7 19.4 16.5
C 3.3 4.5 15.2 3.0 2.4 4.5 3.4
D 1.9 3.4 3.0 - 3.7 0.8 1.9
E 21.5 14.3 12.1 1.0 12.5 15.7 20.4
F 2.7 1.2 - - 1.8 3.0 2.6
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source: Civil Protection Department, Ministry of Interior.
buildings across levels of damages and figure 1 plots the map of damages across municipalities in the epicentral
region. Out of 75,424 buildings visited by the CPD and INGV specialists 55.2 percent were ranked at level
’A’, 16.5 percent ’B’, 3.4 percent ’C’, 1.9 percent ’D’, 20.4 percent ’E’ and the remaining 2.6 percent ’F’ with
no significant diﬀerences across types of buildings.
As a second task, the delegates assigned a number to the municipalities in the epicentral region according
to the severity of the damages.7 This number reflects a level of the so-called ’Mercalli scale’ which quantifies
the eﬀects of an earthquake on the Earth’s surface, humans, objects of nature, and man-made structures on
twelve notches ranging from I (’instrumental’) to XII (’catastrophic’).8 The definitions of the Mercalli levels
are reported in C, while figure 2 plots the map of the earthquake, highlighting each municipality according
to the Mercalli rank.9
unusable building’; D: ’temporary unusable building’; E: ’unusable building’; F: ’unusable building and severe external risks’.
For details see Baggio et al. [2007].
7Because of the extension and severity of the damages in the epicentral region, the delegates did not distinguish between
Mercalli levels below V and assigned a 0 instead (not shown in the map).
8As an example we report the definition of level VI (Strong): People: Felt by all. People and animals alarmed. Many run
outside. Diﬃculty experienced in walking steadily. Fittings: Objects fall from shelves. Pictures fall from walls. Some furniture
moved on smooth floors, some unsecured free-standing fireplaces moved. Glassware and crockery broken. Very unstable furniture
overturned. Small church and school bells ring. Appliances move on bench or table tops. Filing cabinets or "easy glide" drawers
may open (or shut). Structures: Slight damage to Buildings Type I. Some stucco or cement plaster falls. Windows Type I
broken. Damage to a few weak domestic chimneys, some may fall. Environment: Trees and bushes shake, or are heard to rustle.
Loose material may be dislodged from sloping ground, e.g. existing slides, talus slopes, shingle slides.
9Out of 305 municipalities in Abruzzo, 177 were ranked below V, 79 at level V (including V-VI), 41 at level VI (including
VI-VII) and 8 at level VII or above. Table 12 shows the distribution across provinces.
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Figure 1: Map of classified damages according to AeDES classification system.
Note: The size of the pies reflects the absolute number of buildings (in brackets) classified in each municipality.
6
Figure 2: Map of ’L’Aquila’ earthquake.
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On April 28th 2009 the central government enacted a law by decree (’Decreto Legge 28 Aprile 2009,
n.39’) establishing a qualifying Mercalli threshold to receive reconstruction grants.10 The threshold, ex-ante
unknown to the delegates, was fixed at level VI, the lowest level associated to (marginal) structural damages
to civil structures (see Appendix C for details). The decision of the government - crucial for our identification
strategy - resulted in a sharp discontinuity around the cut-oﬀ, with 49 municipalities at the immediate right
(level VI and VI-VII) and 73 to the left (level V and V-VI). Figure 3 shows the discontinuity by plotting
total grants against the Mercalli scale. The average per capita grant to the left of the cut-oﬀ is 488.4 Euros
Figure 3: Discontinuity in grants.
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while it increases to 2949.6 Euros per capita to the right. The cross-sectional standard deviation of grants
is higher to the right-hand-side because the overall amount is proportional to the extension of the damages
- meaning the number of buildings damaged - which is not captured by the Mercalli scale (which instead
10For completeness we report the original text (in Italian) from the law by decree (’Decreto Legge’ 28 Aprile 2009, n.39): “I
predetti provvedimenti hanno eﬀetto esclusivamente nei confronti dei comuni interessati dagli eventi sismici che hanno colpito la
regione Abruzzo a partire dal 6 aprile 2009 che, sulla base dei dati risultanti dai rilievi macrosismici eﬀettuati dal Dipartimento
della protezione civile, hanno risentito un’intensita’ MSC uguale o superiore al sesto grado”.
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identifies the severity of the damages).11
The exogenous reconstruction grants were used by the qualified municipalities for two diﬀerent purposes.
On the one hand they financed post-disaster activities directed towards the reconstruction of public and
private buildings. On the other hand, they compensated municipal budges for losses in revenues due to the
suspension of local taxes. Figures 9 and 10 show the discontinuity in total expenditure (current and capital)
and total tax revenues across municipalities according to Mercalli ranks. There exhists a sharp discontinuity
in local government expenditures at Mercalli VI which closely mimics the discontinuity in grants. However,
the discontinuity in tax revenues is observed at Mercalli VII rather then VI with 49 municipalities on the
immediate left of the cut-oﬀ (Mercalli VI and VI-VII) and 8 to the right (at or above Mercalli VII).12 The
fact that the discontinuities in grants, local spending and local tax revenues are identified at diﬀerent Mercalli
levels allows a neat identification of respectively the ’grants multiplier’, the ’local spending multiplier’ net of
marginal tax rebates and the ’local tax multiplier’ net of variations in the tax base.
3 The empirical model
In our study we aim to estimate the short-run multiplicative eﬀects of reconstruction grants on local
economic activity at the municipal level following the 2009 ’Aquilano’ seismic event. We present the empirical
model and our instrument in this section while we discuss our baseline results in section 5.
For each municipality i let yi,t denote the real per capita value added in year t, and Yi,t its rate of growth
defined as Yi,t = yi,t yi,t 1yi,t 1 . Also, let gi,t denote the real per capita value of grants received by municipality
i in year t from the central government,13 and Gi,t its growth rate as a ratio of lagged output, defined as
Gi,t =
gi,t gi,t 1
yi,t 1 . Following the recent literature (see for instance Barro and Redlick [2011] or Acconcia et al.
[2011]) we estimate the grants multiplier relating the growth of per capita value added in municipality i (Yi,t),
to the correspondent change in per capita grants in the same municipality in the same year (Gi,t).
11See figure 7 for the correlation between Mercalli ranks and the index of damages.
12The discontinuity in tax revenues is generated by two shocks: a negative shock to the tax base (mainly buildings for the
property tax) and a shock to the marginal tax rate due to the suspension of tax payments in 2009 for municipalities reporting
severe damages.
13As a measure of grants we consider the sum of both, current and capital grants from central government given that regional
government did not provide any financial support for the reconstruction.
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Our empirical strategy is based on a linear fixed-eﬀect panel data model with a diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences
approach relying on the identical ex-ante behavior across control and treatment groups identified around the
Mercalli VI cut-oﬀ. The empirical model is
Yi,t = ↵i +  t +  Interactioni,t +  Damagesi,t +  1Gi,t +  2Di,t + ✓
0
Xi,t + ⌘i,t (1)
where ↵i is a municipal fixed-eﬀect,  t is a time trend, Di,t is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 for the
municipalities belonging to the treatment group and 0 for the municipalities in the control group, ✓
0
is a vector
of coeﬃcients, Xi,t is a set of control variables, and ⌘i,t is a disturbance term. As standard in the literature,
the variable Interactioni,t interacts Gi,t with Di,t, and the coeﬃcient   measures the contemporaneous one-
year grants multiplier, meaning the elasticity of local output to exogenous shocks in grants. The selection
criteria of the bandwidth around the discontinuity (figure 3) should satisfy the crucial assumption of ex-ante
similarity between the control and the treatment group. Following Imbens and Kalyanaraman [2010] we
estimate the optimal bandwith around the discontinuity in grants which suggests to compare Mercalli V and
V-VI ranked municipalities (control group) to Mercalli VI (treatment group). Figure 4 plots the variable of
interest (local output) across the two groups (in order to ensure consistency in our estimates we also check
the similarity of other observable characteristics, see table 14 in Appendix D). Before the event there exhists
a clear common trend but when the earthquake strikes output contracts less for treated municipalities than
for the rest. Also, the ex-ante behavior of grants is tested to be identical across control and treatment group
before the event.14
The variable Damagesi,t captures the negative supply shock generated by the earthquake and the coeﬃ-
cient   identifies the contemporaneous one-year output growth loss due to the destruction of physical capital.
Our measure of capital stock loss is a weighted average of the number of buildings categorized in each AeDES
level expressed as a share of the population. Formally
Damagesi,t =
PF
k=A !k ·Buildingsk,i,t
Populationi,t
, (2)
14We tested the ex-ante similarity of each variable of interest by regressing the variable on a set of yearly dummies and the
interaction between the year dummies and Di,t. The F-statistics on the interactions never reject the null hypothesis of similar
behavior across treatment and control groups. Specifically, the p-values of the F-test are the following: output (0.4941), grants
(0.9083), and local spending (0.3431).
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Figure 4: Per capita GDP (2004 = 100).
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where !A = 0, !B = 0, !C = 0.5, !D = 0.5, !E = 1, !F = 1.15 The variable Damagesi,t captures both, the
severity and the extension of the damages. A higher score in the index can be determined either by a higher
number of buildings reporting damages or (conditional on a given number of buildings) by a higher number
of buildings reporting severe damages (categorized on a higher AeDES level).
Through the inclusion of fixed eﬀects we capture unobserved time invariant municipal characteristics. In
order to avoid collinearity issues between the variable Damagesi,t and yearly dummies we include a time
trend16 ( t) that controls for aggregate monetary and fiscal policies aﬀecting growth across all municipalities.
Our choice to include a common time trend across municipalities is consistent with the evidence presented
in figure 4.17 Furthermore, our diﬀerence in diﬀerences approach addresses potential endogeneity problems
raised by the possibility that municipal-specific characteristics may be correlated with grants allocation
criteria. For instance, it may be possible that the central government systematically allocates more resources
15Robustness checks (not reported in this version of the paper but available on request) show that our results are insensitive
to this choice.
16We specify a quadratic trend. This choice - instead of a linear trend - is driven by the observed U-shaped growth path
during the considered period. Specifying a linear trend instead of quadratic makes little (or no diﬀerence) on the estimated
parameters.
17The inclusion of individual-specific time trends makes no diﬀerence on the estimates. For this reason we prefer a more
conservative model with a common trend across municipalities.
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in municipalities with output growth below the median in an attempt to boost it. Under this allocation rule
the coeﬃcient  1 would be downwardly biased while   would correctly capture the exogenous component of
grants.
Another possible source of endogeneity is represented by the variable Damagesi,t. The negative supply
shock captured with our index of damages might be either downwardly biased if municipalities with higher
per capita income report less damages because of an ex-ante lower vulnerability of the buildings, or upwardly
biased if municipalities with ex-ante higher output growth reported a higher ex-post index of damages due to
the higher per capita capital stock. We address this potential issue in two ways. First, we consider the rate of
growth of output as dependent variable instead of its level. Second, we instrument the variable Damagesi,t
relying on the strict exogeneity and randomness18 of the earthquake. As an instrument we use the inverse
of the distance of each municipality from the epicenter (variable Distancei,t).19 Given this instrument, our
estimates are unbiased under three conditions. First, the distance should be a good predictor of the damages.
Figure 8 provides robust evidence in support of this hypothesis. Second, the distance and the stochastic
component of output growth should be uncorrelated, formally E("i.t|Distancei,t) = 0. Finally, the distance
should be uncorrelated with output growth (Yi,t) in order to satisfy the necessary exclusion restrictions
criteria, formally E(Yi.t|Distancei,t) = 0. Preliminary regressions show that the distance is indeed highly
correlated with the damages while it is not with output growth.
As regards the matrix of controlsXi,t we include three variables capturing the evolution of the population:
(i) total number of residents at December the 31th of each year, (ii) share of population younger than 14
years old, and (iii) share of population older than 65 years old (see Appendix D for details).
4 Data
Our dataset is a balanced panel of 305 municipalities over the period 2002 - 2011 for a total of 3,050
observations. All municipalities are located in the region of Abruzzo (see map in figure 11). Our choice
18Abruzzo is the second most seismic region in Italy after Calabria. Virtually the entire territory is classified as ’highly seismic’
by the INGV. Therefore, the ex-ante probability of an earthquake (meaning the ex-ante probability of a municipality to be
relatively close to the epicenter) is uniformly distributed across points in the region.
19The coordinates of the epicenter were determined by the INGV and they are as follows: latitude 42.295, longitude 13.628.
The distance is calculated using the municipal coordinates released by the national institute of statistics (typically the chosen
point is the center of the inhabited part of the municipal surface).
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eliminates 14 municipalities ranked at Mercalli V or V-VI in the neighborhood region of Lazio.20 However,
the earthquake did not generate Mercalli ranks higher than V-VI outside Abruzzo and no municipalities
qualified for reconstruction grants in Lazio. Also, our main dependent variable (GDP) is not available for
municipalities in Lazio because it is estimated only for southern regions. For this reason, we prefer to restrict
the attention to Abruzzo only and maximize the ex-ante similarity between control and treatment group.
As a measure of municipal economic activity we rely on four diﬀerent variables. Our main dependent
variable is the municipal value added (GDP ) estimated by the European Union Commission to monitor the
development of the so-called European ’zones 3’. These estimates are based on the oﬃcial figures of provin-
cial21 value added released by the Italian National Institute of Statistics (ISTAT ) decomposed according
to the sectoral composition of output at the municipal level. Given the possibility of measurement errors
in the dependent variable we consider three alternatives. As a first alternative we employ high-resolution
data on night lights density measured by satellites at night. These data come from the National Geophys-
ical Data Center (NGDC) of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (U.S. Department of
Commerce)22 and it has been shown (Henderson et al. [2012]) to proxy well for local economic activity. For
our purposes we use the ’Average Visible, Stable Lights, and Cloud Free’ images taken from two satellites:
F16 for the years from 2004 to 2009 and F18 for 2010 and 2011. The luminosity of each municipality is
calculated by taking the average luminosity of all pixels corresponding to the surface of the municipality.
Figure 12 shows the average luminosity over night in 2007 for the municipalities in our sample while figure
6 plots the remarkably high correlation between the GDP growth rates and night luminosity growth rates
across all municipalities in the sample. As a final check, we collected data on other two alternative dependent
variables: total declared personal income (tax base of national personal income tax) and business income
provided by the Italian Ministry of Economics and Finance. The first one refers to the sum of all declared
personal incomes in each municipality in each year and it oﬀers the advantage of reducing the possibility of
measurement errors due to fiscal evasion. The second one refers to the sum of all incomes generated by small
and medium firms and self-employed workers, therefore oﬀering an excellent proxy of economic activity.
20The municipalities are: ’Accumoli’, ’Amatrice’, ’Antrodoco’, ’Borbona’, ’Borgo Velino’, ’Borgorose’, ’Castel Sant’Angelo’,
’Cittaducale’, ’Cittareale’, ’Fiamignano’, ’Micigliano’, ’Pescoracchiano’, ’Petrella Salto’ and ’Posta’, all located in the province
of Rieti.
21The Italian provinces are well defined political and geographical entities similar to the US counties. In Abruzzo there are
four provinces (’Chieti’, ’L’Aquila’, ’Pescara’, and ’Teramo’) composed by an average of 76 municipalities each.
22The data are publicly available at: http://ngdc.noaa.gov/eog/dmsp/downloadV4composites.html
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Fiscal data come from the municipal budget accounts (’certificati di conto consuntivi’ ) released by the
Italian Ministry of Interior. These data include disaggregated information on expenditures, revenues and
grants recorded on accrual bases. All monetary variables are deflated using the regional consumer price
index from the Italian National Institute of Statistics (ISTAT ). Demographic variables and time invariant
characteristics are taken from ISTAT . We also include a set of political variables collected from the Ministry
of the Interior such as municipal turnover and voting patterns at regional elections, and political alignment
of the local government with the central government.23 A detailed description of all variables, sources and
summary statistics is reported in Appendix D. All earthquakes-related geophysical data (including Mercalli
ranks) come from the Italian National Institute of Geophysics and Vulcanology (’2011 Italian Macroseismic
Database (DBMI11))’; table 13 reports the distribution of Mercalli ranks across all years for all recorded
events showing that the only major quake in the considered period is the one of interest in this paper. Finally,
data on AeDES classified buildings come from the Civil Protection Department.
23For the measure of the political orientation of each municipality, we take the results of regional election rather than the
results of municipal elections because the presence of local political parties which do not allow to unambiguously identify the
political orientation of the council. Instead, at regional elections voters choose among the same parties as in the general elections.
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5 Results
In this section, we discuss the results from our regression model. Table 2 reports the baseline results
using value added as dependent variable. There are 73 municipalities in the control group (52 with Mercalli
rank V and 21 with V-VI) and 43 in the treatment group (Mercalli VI). We run our baseline considering the
period 2008-2011 for a total of 464 observations (116 municipalities, 4 years). The choice of the time span for
the baseline is determined by the necessity of maximing the similarity of the institutional framework given
the 2008 reform of grants allocation which followed the reform in the municipal property tax. In robustness
checks we extend both, the regession sample and the time dimension and show that our results are fully
robust to the sample structure. The first two columns of table 2 refer to the diﬀerence in diﬀerences model
(’Model 1’) while the remaining four columns (’Model 2’) show the results instrumenting the Damagesi,t
with the Distancei,t (the last two columns of table 2 shows the first stage of the 2SLS estimation). Each
model contains two separate columns which diﬀer for the inclusions of demographic controls.
As reported in table 2, the one-year multiplier is statistically diﬀerent from zero at 1 percent level in both
models with point estimates respectively of 0.15 and 0.36. Considering model 2 as a reference, this result
suggests that an exogenous increase in reconstruction grants by 1 percent of local value added determines a
contemporaneous increase in local output of 0.36 percent. The variable Damagesi,t enters in model 1 with
the expected negative coeﬃcient. Once the damages are instrumented (model 2), the coeﬃcient is significant
at 1 percent level and the magnitude is higher than model 1 signaling endogeneity (the point estimates of  ˆ
average around -0.32). The upward bias in model 1 is determined by the fact that the municipalities with
ex-ante higher output growth reported a higher ex-post index of damages due to the higher capital stock.
Given that the mean of the index of damages is 0.11 in the regression sample, the result from model 2 implies
a negative impact of the quake of around 3.5 percentage points24 on output growth. Overall, given an average
grants shock of 7.0 percent of local output in the regression sample, the negative supply shock generated by
the quake is entirely compensated by the countercyclical reconstruction policies.
24The figure is calculated by multiplying 0.11 times 0.32.
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Table 2: Baseline results.
Model 1 (DiD) Model 2 (DiD + IV) Model 2 (first stage)
Interaction 0.145** 0.146** 0.367*** 0.363*** 0.500*** 0.494***
[0.061] [0.061] [0.096] [0.094] [0.178] [0.178]
Damages -0.017 -0.023 -0.314*** -0.315*** - -
[0.046] [0.046] [0.086] [0.084]
Distance - - - - 1.544*** 1.547***
[0.429] [0.431]
Controls YES YES YES
Constant YES YES YES YES YES YES
Fixed eﬀects YES YES YES YES YES YES
Gi,t and Di,t YES YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 464 464 464 464 464 464
R2 0.35 0.37 - - 0.66 0.66
Underidentification test (Kleibergen-Paap) - - 14.7 15.1
Weak identification test (Cragg-Donald) - - 71.9 72.3
Note: robust standard errors in brackets.
⇤⇤⇤ indicates significance at 1% level, ⇤⇤ at 5% ⇤ at 10%.
This result is in line with the oﬃcial GDP estimates released by the Italian national institute of statistics
(ISTAT ) at the provincial level according to which output growth in 2009 in the province of L’Aquila25 was
25According to ISTAT output contracted by 5.5 percent in Italy in 2009. Not surprisingly, the contraction was bigger for
Abruzzo region (6.6 percent) given that traditionally the output performance of southern regions is lower than the corresponding
national one. However, output contracted only by 5.2 percent in the province of L’Aquila despite the seismic event.
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slightly higher than the national one despite the seismic event.
Table 3: Spending multiplier results.
Model 1 (DiD) Model 2 (DiD + IV) Model 2 (first stage)
Interaction 0.108* 0.113* 0.332*** 0.331*** 0.511*** 0.509***
[0.063] [0.064] [0.098] [0.096] [0.179] [0.178]
Damages -0.013 -0.019 -0.307*** -0.308*** - -
[0.049] [0.050] [0.085] [0.082]
Distance - - - - 1.559*** 1.555***
[0.470] [0.461]
Controls YES YES YES
Constant YES YES YES YES YES YES
Fixed eﬀects YES YES YES YES YES YES
Gi,t and Di,t YES YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 464 464 464 464 464 464
R2 0.35 0.37 - - 0.65 0.65
Underidentification test (Kleibergen-Paap) - - 15.3 15.9
Weak identification test (Cragg-Donald) - - 71.4 71.3
Note: robust standard errors in brackets.
⇤⇤⇤ indicates significance at 1% level, ⇤⇤ at 5% ⇤ at 10%.
The first stage reported in the last two columns of table 2 confirms two important priors. First, there
exhists a very high correlation between Distancei,t and Damagesi,t (see figure 8 for a graphical evidence).
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The coeﬃcient of Distancei,t is significant at 1 percent level with point estimates around 1.55. Second, there
exhists a very high correlation between reconstruction grants and the index of damages. The coeﬃcient of
Interactioni,t is significant at 1 percent level with point estimates at 0.50. The goodness of fit is satisfactory
in both models: the R2 is as high as 0.37 for model 2 while it increases to 0.66 in the first stage. Also, the
underidentification test (Kleibergen-Paap LM statistic) and the weak identification test (Cragg-Donald Wald
F statistic) confirm that our instrument is indeed a valid one. Finally, we provide evidence that the ’grants
multiplier’ can be interpreted as a ’local spending multiplier’ around the Mercalli VI cutoﬀ. In table 3 we
report the output elasticity estimated following the baseline and substituting the grants with local spending
(current plus capital municipal expenditure). Because around the cutoﬀ there is no discontinuity in local tax
revenues as shown in figure 10, the coeﬃcient of the variable Interactioni,t in table 3 is virtually identical
to the baseline (0.33 versus 0.36) and therefore it can be interpreted as a ’local spending multiplier’ net of
marginal tax rebates.
6 Robustness checks and further results
We compare our baseline results against a large set of robustness checks. In this section we explain the
set of checks and presents the results of these complementary regressions. For brevity, we present the checks
only of the baseline while the tables showing the corresponding checks for spending are virtually identical
and available upon request.
Diﬀerent bandwidth. As a first additional result we allow for a diﬀerent bandwidth with respect to the
baseline. The results of this check are shown in table 5.26 We consider three alternative bandwidths. In the
first one (first two columns of the table) we consider a more restrictive bandwidth with respect to the baseline
and include only Mercalli V-VI and Mercalli VI for a total of 64 municipalities (21 in the control group and
43 in the treatment group). The multiplicative eﬀects of exogenous grants is significative at 1 percent level
with point estimates as high as 0.27 in the diﬀerence in diﬀerences model cum instrumental variables. Also
the variable Damagesi,t enters significantly at 1 percent level with the expected sign and a magnitude similar
to the one in the baseline. Similar results, presented in the two central columns of table 5, emerge when
26In the last two models the number of observations is 486 rather 488 and 1212 rather then 1220 because 4 municipalities are
missing the 2010 and 2011 fiscal entries. The municipalities (all located in the province of L’Aquila) are: ’Capistrello’, ’Carapelle
Calvision’, ’Civitella Alfedena’, and ’Scontrone’.
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considering as a bandwidth all municipalities ranked between Mercalli V and Mercalli VI-VII (this choice
enlarges the number of municipalities used in the regressions to 122 for a total of 486 observations). The only
significant diﬀerence compared to the baseline emerges in the last three columns of table 5 where we allow in
the regressions for all municipalities equal or above Mercalli V for a total of 130 municipalities.27 Given the
observed discontinuity in local taxes (figure 10), in this case we introduce three extra variables in the model:
an additional treatment dummy that takes the value of 1 for municipalities ranked at or above Mercalli VII,
the per capita total tax revenues in each municipality and the interaction between the two. The coeﬃcient
of the interaction variable captures the output elasticity to an exogenous variation in the marginal tax rate
(driven by the property tax rate) net of variations of the tax base (captured by the variable Damagesi,t).
Therefore, the coeﬃcient of the new interaction variable can be interpreted as a ’ local tax multiplier’. The
estimates reported in table 5 remain in line with the baseline for the ’grants multiplier’ and for the index of
damages. On the other hand, the estimated ’tax multiplier’ is well above unity with point estimate at 2.5.
Although we rely on a robust identification strategy, this last result should be interpreted with caution given
that only eight municipalities are included in the additional treatment group (above Mercalli VII). However,
this estimate of the ’local tax multiplier’ is virtually the only empirical estimate at the local level in Italy.
Extending the time period. As a second exercise we check whether the time choice made in our
baseline is the driver of our results. In this check we progressively extend the time dimension of our panel
in order to maximize the number of observations included in the regressions. The results of this check are
reported in table 6.28 The first three columns consider the period from 2006 to 2011 and we report the
results of model 1 (first column), model 2 (second column), and the first stage of model 2 (third column).
The same logic is applied to the remaining columns of the table that show the results when considering all
years included in our dataset (from 2002 to 2011). This last regression runs over 1,160 observations (116
municipalities over 10 years). Overall, the evidence emerging from table 6 largely confirms our baseline. All
coeﬃcients in model 2 (including the first stage) remain significant at 1 percent level, the magnitude of the
estimates is in line with the baseline as well as the goodness of fit the models and the instrumental variables
tests.
27The total number of observations in these regressions is 518 rather then 520 because the municipality of ’Carapelle Calvisio’
did not report the budget data for 2010 and 2011.
28In the last three columns the number of observations is 1,158 rather than 1,160 because the 2003 and 2004 fiscal data for
municipality of ’Secinaro’ are missing.
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Alternative dependent variable. As a final check we employ a set of diﬀerent dependent variables as
a measure of economic activity. The first alternative dependent variable that we consider is the average night
lights intensity over the year as recorded by satellite images. Because this variable is an indirect measure
of economic activity, we do not express the growth rate of real per capita grants as a ratio of the lagged
dependent variable. Rather, we express it as a ratio of its own lag
⇣
Git, =
gi,t gi,t 1
gi,t 1
⌘
. The results of these
regressions are shown in table 7. The variables of interest enter with the expected sign and they are significant
at 1 percent level in model 2. The magnitude of  ˆ in this case cannot be interpreted as a traditional multiplier
given the definition of Gi,t. However, it is possible to recover the multiplier estimating the average fiscal
shock G¯t (0.47), the average change in night light intensity Y¯t (0.05), and the elasticity between night lights
change and output change (0.03). In our sample such multiplier is estimated at 0.35, remarkably close to the
baseline result. Furthermore, the goodness of fit of the models is significantly high as well as the instrumental
variables tests are all well above the critical values. The other two alternative dependent variables that we
employ are total income and business income. We report the results of these regressions respectively in table
8 and 9. Despite the fact that the source of these data is not the same as for the previous regressions, we
obtain very similar results compared to the baseline. The multiplier estimated using total income is 0.21
and the variable damages is significant at 1 percent level. On the other hand, employing business income
as dependent variable confirms the baseline in two dimensions (despite the lower number of observations):29
the level of significance of grants and the sign of the damages, although the magnitude of the latter is higher
than in the baseline.
Placebo. As third check we run a placebo experiment. Because Mercalli ranks between I and V were not
assigned, we compare Mercalli 0 ranked municipalities with Mercalli V assuming the former as control group
and the latter as treatment group. In this case the regression sample is composed by 227 municipalities out
of which 175 in the control group and 52 in the treatment and the variable Di,t is a dummy that takes the
value of 1 for Mercalli V and 0 for Mercalli 0. We report the results of these regressions in table 10.30 The
evidence confirms our baseline since none of the coeﬃcient of interests ( ˆ and  ˆ) are significant. Also, in
model 1 the variable Damagesi,t enters with the wrong coeﬃcient as well as the distance in the first stage of
29The lower number of observations is due to missing values in the data from the Ministry of Interior due to ’privacy issues’.
30The total number of observations in table 10 is 902 rather than 908 (= 227 times 4) since three municipalities have not
reported the budgets for 2010 and 2011. The three municipalities (all located in the province of L’Aquila and all reporting a
Mercalli 0 in 2009) are: ’Capistrello’, ’Civitella Alfedena’, and ’Scontrone’.
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model 2.
Errors robust to clusters. As a fourth check we allow for errors robust to geographical clusters. As is
well known, inference in panel estimation can be highly misleading if there is spatial correlation within groups
of observations (Bertrand et al. [2004]). Following a common approach in the literature, in this check our
inference is based on standard errors robust to clusters, allowing for individual clusters (therefore maximizing
the possible number of clusters). Our results are reported in table 11 and they confirm the baseline since all
coeﬃcients remain significant at 1 percent level.
7 Conclusion
In this paper we have contributed evidence of local fiscal multipliers. By relying on a natural event in
Italy, we estimated the output eﬀect generated by the event, as a result of two combined shocks, the negative
supply shock due to the quake, and the positive demand shock driven by reconstruction grants. Using a
diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences cum instrumental variables analysis we have shown non negligible output eﬀects of
negative supply shocks. In our estimates, the output loss from the quake averages 3.7 percentage points.
Also, we estimated the ’grants multipliers’ as high as 0.36. Spending multipliers net of marginal tax rebates
are estimated virtually identical to grants multipliers while tax multipliers net of variations in the tax base
are estimated well above unity.
The policy relevance of quantifying local fiscal multipliers is apparent. On one hand, we shed light to
the extent to which fiscal tools can alleviate the output loss generated by large idyosinchratic shocks like
earthquakes. On the other hand, this paper analyzes the optimality of the institutional rule used to allocate
grants after the event. Regarding the first factor we showed that reconstruction grants eﬀectively provided
public insurance following the event preventing output from falling below trend. However, the marginal
cost of this insurance scheme is estimated to be particularly high (also stressed by the stark evidence on
small ’local spending multiplier’ and high ’local tax multiplier’) raising the need of future research on the
eﬃciency of public funds management. Regarding the second factor, our study pointed out that the grants
allocation rule used after the 2009 ’Aquilano’ quake based on a discontinuous scale might not be optimal
since it translated into significant geographical variations in economic activity across neighbor municipalities
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with similar damages. In this dimension, a grants allocation based on a combination between a discontinuous
variables such as the Mercalli scale and a continuos variable such as the distance from the epicenter could
provide a more equitable and eﬃcient distribution of grants.
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Appendix
A Are the Mercalli ranks artificially manipulated?
Given our identification strategy, a natural concern about the Mercalli ranks is whether they eﬀectively reflect
the damaged suﬀered by each municipality or whether they are artificially manipulated. This would happen
if, for instance, the delegates assigned higher ranks to poorer municipalities or to municipalities in which the
mayor belongs to the same political area of the central government. In this way reconstruction grants would
be endogenous to political or economic cycles.
We test this hypothesis using a probit model estimated by maximum-likelihood. Our goal is to test
whether the decision of classifying a municipality as Mercalli VI instead of V was based on the recorded
damages only31 or was influenced by other factors (although the qualifying threshold was ex ante unknown
to the delegates). The empirical model is
DM i = ↵+  Damagesi +  
0
Zi +  
0
Xi + ⌘i. (3)
where DMi is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 for Mercalli VI and zero for V or V-VI, Zi is
a matrix containing the other variables of interest (municipal output, municipal unemployment rate, and
political alignment with the central government since reconstruction grants come almost exclusively from the
central government), Xi is a matrix that contains all other controls,32   and   are vectors of coeﬃcients, and
⌘i is a disturbance term. We are interested in testing whether   or any of the coeﬃcients in   are significantly
diﬀerent from zero. As a proxy of political ’allignment’ of each municipality with the central government, we
take the results of the previous regional election.33
Our results are shown in table 4. We consider four models with an increasing number of regressors and
controls.
31We assume that each building was correctly categorized following the AeDES system. This assumption is reinforced by the
fact that the owner of the building is typically allowed to ask for a double check if the AeDES level is somehow controversial.
32The list of controls used in this regression is as follows (see D for definitions and sources): unemployment, alignment,
population band, graduates, unliterary, altimetry, altimetrymax, altimetrymin, urbanization, surface, coast, family, foreigners,
commuters, head, left, buildings19, buildings45, buildings61, buildings71, buildings81, buildings91, buildingspost91.
33We take the results of the previous regional election rather than the results of municipal elections because the huge hetero-
geneity of local political parties who run for mayoral elections do not allow us to identify the political orientation of the council.
Instead, at regional elections voters choose among the very same parties as in the general elections.
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Table 4: Probit analysis results.
Model A Model B Model C Model D
Damages 5.327*** 24.350*** 5.263*** 23.770**
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
GDP 0.000 0.000
[0.944] [0.549]
Unemployment -0.028 -0.054
[0.492] [0.546]
Alignment 0.016 0.011
[0.161] [0.603]
Controls YES YES
Constant YES YES YES YES
Number of observations 116 116 116 116
Log likelihood -55.39 -25.94 -54.07 -25.33
P-values in brackets. ⇤⇤⇤ significant at 1%, ⇤⇤ at 5% and ⇤ at 10%.
The only variable with some explanatory power is the index of damages.34 All other regressors, including
municipal output, municipal unemployment rate and political alignment are not statistically diﬀerent from
zero. We take this result as an evidence that the Mercalli ranks reflect only the damages generated by
the earthquake (additional evidence on the exogeneity of Mercalli ranks is provided by Porcelli and Trezzi).
Finally, because the coeﬃcients in a probit model do not provide direct measure of the partial eﬀect, we
estimate the marginal eﬀect of the variable Damagesi keeping all other variables at their mean levels.
The marginal eﬀect is reported in figure 5. Visibly, the index of damages alone is able to increase the
probability of receiving reconstruction grants to 1 for values slightly below 0.3. A yellow vertical line reports
the average value of damages (0.25) at Mercalli VI which is associated with a marginal probability non
statistically diﬀerent from 1 indicating that the damages alone - and no other variables - can explain whether
34Very similar results are obtained when allowing for the distance as a regressor instead of the damages.
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a municipality qualifies or not for reconstruction grants.
Figure 5: Marginal probability - Damages variable.
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Table 5: Diﬀerent bandwidth results.
V-VI to VI V to VI-VII Equal or higher than V
DiD DiD + IV First stage DiD DiD + IV First stage DiD DiD + IV First stage
Interaction grants 0.139** 0.268*** 0.484*** 0.156** 0.441*** 0.695*** 0.108** 0.325*** 0.721***
[0.066] [0.076] [0.190] [0.062] [0.116] [0.179] [0.045] [0.084] [0.127]
Interaction taxes - - - - - - -0.673 -2.559** 0.061
[0.738] [1.006] [0.042]
Damages -0.018 -0.192*** - -0.010 -0.315*** - -0.004 -0.246*** -
[0.051] [0.065] [0.030] [0.086] [0.030] [0.077]
Distance - - 1.577*** - - 1.175*** - - 1.125***
[0.548] [0.362] [0.346]
Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Constant YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Fixed eﬀects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Gi,t and Di,t YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 256 256 256 486 486 486 518 518 518
R2 0.42 - 0.67 0.38 - 0.71 0.40 - 0.77
Underidentification test - 15.4 - 17.5 - 20.0
Weak identification test - 33.3 - 49.5 - 49.1
Note: robust standard errors in brackets.
⇤⇤⇤ indicates significance at 1% level, ⇤⇤ at 5% ⇤ at 10%.
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Table 6: Diﬀerent time selection results.
2006 to 2011 2002 to 2011
DiD DiD + IV First stage DiD DiD + IV First stage
Interaction 0.101* 0.330*** 0.504*** 0.097* 0.432*** 0.538***
[0.055] [0.096] [0.187] [0.053] [0.131] [0.187]
Damages -0.038 -0.337*** - -0.046 -0.466*** -
[0.049] [0.086] [0.051] [0.118]
Distance - - 1.523*** - - 1.492***
[0.419] [0.415]
Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES
Constant YES YES YES YES YES YES
Fixed eﬀects YES YES YES YES YES YES
Gi,t and Di,t YES YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 696 696 696 1158 1158 1158
R2 0.25 - 0.66 0.19 - 0.66
Underidentification test - 14.7 - - 13.9
Weak identification test - 124.7 - - 223.7
Note: robust standard errors in brackets.
⇤⇤⇤ indicates significance at 1% level, ⇤⇤ at 5% ⇤ at 10%.
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Table 7: Night lights intensity as dependent variable.
Model 1 (DiD) Model 2 (DiD + IV) Model 2 (first stage)
Interaction 0.073*** 0.069*** 0.074*** 0.072** -0.003 -0.003
[0.016] [0.016] [0.028] [0.029] [0.011] [0.011]
Damages -0.045 -0.060 -1.850*** -1.886*** - -
[0.071] [0.072] [0.489] [0.486]
Distance - - - - 2.024*** 2.021***
[0.501] [0.495]
Controls YES YES YES
Constant YES YES YES YES YES YES
Fixed eﬀects YES YES YES YES YES YES
Gi,t and Di,t YES YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 464 464 464 464 464 464
R2 0.53 0.54 - - 0.60 0.61
Underidentification test (Kleibergen-Paap) - - 16.2 16.7
Weak identification test (Cragg-Donald) - - 115.7 115.4
Note: robust standard errors in brackets.
⇤⇤⇤ indicates significance at 1% level, ⇤⇤ at 5% ⇤ at 10%.
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Table 8: Income as dependent variable results.
Model 1 (DiD) Model 2 (DiD + IV) Model 2 (first stage)
Interaction 0.130 0.129 0.225* 0.215 0.757*** 0.749***
[0.099] [0.098] [0.134] [0.133] [0.198] [0.200]
Damages -0.117*** -0.117*** -0.208*** -0.199*** - -
[0.039] [0.040] [0.077] [0.077]
Distance - - - - 1.503*** 1.508***
[0.412] [0.422]
Controls YES YES YES
Constant YES YES YES YES YES YES
Fixed eﬀects YES YES YES YES YES YES
Gi,t and Di,t YES YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 464 464 464 464 464 464
R2 0.31 0.32 - - 0.67 0.67
Underidentification test (Kleibergen-Paap) - - 16.1 16.6
Weak identification test (Cragg-Donald) - - 73.4 73.8
Note: robust standard errors in brackets.
⇤⇤⇤ indicates significance at 1% level, ⇤⇤ at 5% ⇤ at 10%.
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Table 9: Business income as dependent variable results.
Model 1 (DiD) Model 2 (DiD + IV) Model 2 (first stage)
Interaction 0.012** 0.012** 0.038* 0.042* 0.005*** 0.005***
[0.005] [0.005] [0.022] [0.022] [0.000] [0.000]
Damages -2.798** -2.721** -7.580* -8.157** - -
[1.074] [1.072] [4.155] [4.149]
Distance - - - - 0.274*** 0.272***
[0.082] [0.087]
Controls YES YES YES
Constant YES YES YES YES YES YES
Fixed eﬀects YES YES YES YES YES YES
Gi,t and Di,t YES YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 215 215 215 215 215 215
R2 0.32 0.32 - - 0.97 0.97
Underidentification test (Kleibergen-Paap) - - 9.2 8.9
Weak identification test (Cragg-Donald) - - 15.1 14.4
Note: robust standard errors in brackets.
⇤⇤⇤ indicates significance at 1% level, ⇤⇤ at 5% ⇤ at 10%.
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Table 10: Placebo test results.
Model 1 (DiD) Model 2 (DiD + IV) Model 2 (first stage)
Interaction -0.105 -0.089 1.124 1.112 0.276 0.275
[0.216] [0.214] [1.134] [1.104] [0.197] [0.198]
Damages 0.126* 0.116* -2.434 -2.393 - -
[0.066] [0.064] [2.157] [2.098]
Distance - - - - -0.002 -0.001
[0.026] [0.025]
Controls YES YES YES
Constant YES YES YES YES YES YES
Fixed eﬀects YES YES YES YES YES YES
Gi,t and Di,t YES YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 902 902 902 902 902 902
R2 0.46 0.48 - - 0.31 0.15
Underidentification test (Kleibergen-Paap) - - 0.0 0.0
Weak identification test (Cragg-Donald) - - 0.0 0.0
Note: robust standard errors in brackets.
⇤⇤⇤ indicates significance at 1% level, ⇤⇤ at 5% ⇤ at 10%.
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Table 11: Clusters results.
Model 1 (DiD) Model 2 (DiD + IV) Model 2 (first stage)
Interaction 0.145** 0.146** 0.367*** 0.363*** 0.500*** 0.494***
[0.061] [0.061] [0.096] [0.095] [0.195] [0.194]
Damages -0.017 -0.023 -0.314*** -0.315*** - -
[0.046] [0.046] [0.091] [0.088]
Distance - - - - 1.544*** 1.547***
[0.486] [0.488]
Controls YES YES YES
Constant YES YES YES YES YES YES
Fixed eﬀects YES YES YES YES YES YES
Gi,t and Di,t YES YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 464 464 464 464 464 464
R2 0.35 0.37 - - 0.65 0.66
Underidentification test (Kleibergen-Paap) - - 11.4 11.8
Weak identification test (Cragg-Donald) - - 71.9 72.3
Note: robust standard errors in brackets.
⇤⇤⇤ indicates significance at 1% level, ⇤⇤ at 5% ⇤ at 10%.
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C Mercalli scale
The Richter scale (or simply ’magnitude’) was invented by Charles Francis Richter at the California Institute
of Technology. It quantifies the energy released during an earthquake on a base-10 logarithmic scale. For
instance, an earthquake that measures 5.0 on the Richter scale has a shaking amplitude 10 times larger than
one that measures 4.0, and corresponds to a 31.6 times larger release of energy. Technically, the magnitude
is defined as the logarithm of the ratio of the amplitude of waves measured by a seismograph to an arbitrary
small amplitude. However, before seismologists were able to measure the moment-magnitude of earthquakes,
other scales were invented to categorize seismic episodes. In 1783 an Italian architect (Pompeo Schiantarelli)
invented a rudimentary scale to classify the aﬀected regions according to the severity of the damages. The
scale underwent several revisions and it is now known as ’Mercalli scale’, from the Italian vulcanologist
Giuseppe Mercalli who modified it in 1908. The scale is a narrative description of the damages defined on
twelve levels ranging from ’instrumental’ (I) to ’catastrophic’ (XII). Here below we report the definitions of
each level.
• I Instrumental People: Not felt except by a very few people under exceptionally favorable circum-
stances.
• II Weak People: Felt by persons at rest, on upper floors or favorably placed.
• III Slight People: Felt indoors, hanging objects may swing, vibration similar to passing of light
trucks,duration may be estimated, may not be recognized as an earthquake.
• IV Moderate People: Generally noticed indoors but not outside. Light sleepers may be awakened.
Vibration may be likened to the passing of heavy traﬃc, or to the jolt of a heavy object falling or
striking the building. Fittings: Doors and windows rattle. Glassware and crockery rattle. Liquids in
open vessels may be slightly disturbed. Standing motorcars may rock. Structures: Walls and frames of
buildings, and partitions and suspended ceilings in commercial buildings, may be heard to creak.
• V Rather Strong People: Generally felt outside, and by almost everyone indoors. Most sleepers
awakened. A few people alarmed. Fittings: Small unstable objects are displaced or upset. Some
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glassware and crockery may be broken. Hanging pictures knock against the wall. Open doors may
swing. Cupboard doors secured by magnetic catches may open. Pendulum clocks stop, start, or change
rate. Structures: Some windows Type I cracked. A few earthenware toilet fixtures cracked.
• VI Strong People: Felt by all. People and animals alarmed. Many run outside. Diﬃculty experienced
in walking steadily. Fittings: Objects fall from shelves. Pictures fall from walls. Some furniture moved
on smooth floors, some unsecured free-standing fireplaces moved. Glassware and crockery broken.
Very unstable furniture overturned. Small church and school bells ring. Appliances move on bench or
table tops. Filing cabinets or "easy glide" drawers may open (or shut). Structures: Slight damage to
Buildings Type I. Some stucco or cement plaster falls. Windows Type I broken. Damage to a few weak
domestic chimneys, some may fall. Environment: Trees and bushes shake, or are heard to rustle. Loose
material may be dislodged from sloping ground, e.g. existing slides, talus slopes, shingle slides.
• VII Very Strong People: General alarm. Diﬃculty experienced in standing. Noticed by motorcar
drivers who may stop. Fittings: Large bells ring. Furniture moves on smooth floors, may move on
carpeted floors. Substantial damage to fragile contents of buildings. Structures: Unreinforced stone
and brick walls cracked. Buildings Type I cracked with some minor masonry falls. A few instances of
damage to Buildings Type II. Unbraced parapets, unbraced brick gables, and architectural ornaments
fall. Roofing tiles, especially ridge tiles may be dislodged. Many unreinforced domestic chimneys
damaged, often falling from roof-line. Water tanks Type I burst. A few instances of damage to brick
veneers and plaster or cement-based linings. Unrestrained water cylinders (water tanks Type II) may
move and leak. Some windows Type II cracked. Suspended ceilings damaged. Environment: Water
made turbid by stirred up mud. Small slides such as falls of sand and gravel banks, and small rock-
falls from steep slopes and cuttings. Instances of settlement of unconsolidated or wet, or weak soils.
Some fine cracks appear in sloping ground. A few instances of liquefaction (i.e. small water and sand
ejections).
• VIII Destructive People: Alarm may approach panic. Steering of motorcars greatly aﬀected. Struc-
tures: Buildings Type I heavily damaged, some collapse. Buildings Type II damaged, some with partial
collapse. Buildings Type III damaged in some cases. A few instances of damage to Structures Type IV.
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Monuments and pre-1976 elevated tanks and factory stacks twisted or brought down. Some pre-1965
infill masonry panels damaged. A few post-1980 brick veneers damaged. Decayed timber piles of houses
damaged. Houses not secured to foundations may move. Most unreinforced domestic chimneys dam-
aged, some below roof-line, many brought down. Environment: Cracks appear on steep slopes and in
wet ground. Small to moderate slides in roadside cuttings and unsupported excavations. Small water
and sand ejections and localized lateral spreading adjacent to streams, canals, lakes, etc.
• IX Violent Structures: Many Buildings Type I destroyed. Buildings Type II heavily damaged, some
collapse. Buildings Type III damaged, some with partial collapse. Structures Type IV damaged in
some cases, some with flexible frames seriously damaged. Damage or permanent distortion to some
Structures Type V. Houses not secured to foundations shifted oﬀ. Brick veneers fall and expose frames.
Environment: Cracking of ground conspicuous. Landsliding general on steep slopes. Liquefaction eﬀects
intensified and more widespread, with large lateral spreading and flow sliding adjacent to streams,
canals, lakes, etc.
• X Intense Structures: Most Buildings Type I destroyed. Many Buildings Type II destroyed. Buildings
Type III heavily damaged, some collapse. Structures Type IV damaged, some with partial collapse.
Structures Type V moderately damaged, but few partial collapses. A few instances of damage to
Structures Type VI. Some well-built timber buildings moderately damaged (excluding damage from
falling chimneys). Environment: Landsliding very widespread in susceptible terrain, with very large
rock masses displaced on steep slopes. Landslide dams may be formed. Liquefaction eﬀects widespread
and severe.
• XI Extreme Structures: Most Buildings Type II destroyed. Many Buildings Type III destroyed.
Structures Type IV heavily damaged, some collapse. Structures Type V damaged, some with partial
collapse. Structures Type VI suﬀer minor damage, a few moderately damaged.
• XII Catastrophic Structures: Most Buildings Type III destroyed. Structures Type IV heavily dam-
aged, some collapse. Structures Type V damaged, some with partial collapse. Structures Type VI
suﬀer minor damage, a few moderately damaged.
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Construction types. Buildings Type I: Buildings with low standard of workmanship, poor mortar, or
constructed of weak materials like mud brick or rammed earth. Soft storey structures (e.g. shops) made
of masonry, weak reinforced concrete or composite materials (e.g. some walls timber, some brick) not well
tied together. Masonry buildings otherwise conforming to buildings Types I to III, but also having heavy
unreinforced masonry towers. (Buildings constructed entirely of timber must be of extremely low quality
to be Type I.). Buildings Type II: Buildings of ordinary workmanship, with mortar of average quality. No
extreme weakness, such as inadequate bonding of the corners, but neither designed nor reinforced to resist
lateral forces. Such buildings not having heavy unreinforced masonry towers. Buildings Type III: Reinforced
masonry or concrete buildings of good workmanship and with sound mortar, but not formally designed to
resist earthquake forces. Structures Type IV: Buildings and bridges designed and built to resist earthquakes
to normal use standards, i.e. no special collapse or damage limiting measures taken (mid-1930s to c. 1970
for concrete and to c. 1980 for other materials). Structures Type V: Buildings and bridges, designed and
built to normal use standards, i.e. no special damage limiting measures taken, other than code requirements,
dating from since c. 1970 for concrete and c. 1980 for other materials. Structures Type VI: Structures,
dating from c. 1980, with well-defined foundation behavior, which have been specially designed for minimal
damage, e.g. seismically isolated emergency facilities, some structures with dangerous or high contents, or
new generation low damage structures. Windows. Type I: Large display windows, especially shop windows.
Type II: Ordinary sash or casement windows. Water tanks. Type I: External, stand mounted, corrugated
iron tanks. Type II: Domestic hot-water cylinders unrestrained except by supply and delivery pipes.
D Description of variables in the dataset
D.1 Population controls
Population: total number of residents at December the 31th of each year. Source: ISTAT. Migration:
total net migration eﬀect (immigrants minus emigrants). Source: ISTAT. Balance: natural balance (births
minus deaths). Source: ISTAT. Population14: share of population younger than 14 years old. Source:
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ISTAT. Population65: share of population older than 65 years old. Source: ISTAT
D.2 Political controls
Alignment: number of votes in favor of the center-left coalition at the regional elections as a share of total
votes. Source: Ministry of Interior. Left: number of votes in favor of the center-left coalition at the regional
elections as a share of total votes. Source: Ministry of Interior.
D.3 Time invariant controls
Unemployment: number of unemployed people as a share of working labor force. Source: ISTAT. Popu-
lation band. Number of residents (1 = small town, 8= large city). Source: ISTAT. Graduates: number
of graduates as a share of total residents. Source: ISTAT. Unliterary: rate of unliterary per thousand
habitants. Source: ISTAT. Altimetry: average altimetry expressed on a discrete scale from 1 (high) to 5
(low). Source: ISTAT. Altimetrymax: maximum altimetry in meters. Source: ISTAT. Altimetrymin:
minimum altimetry in meters. Source: ISTAT. Urbanization: degree of urbanization rate, measured on
a discrete scale from 1 (low) to 3 (high). Source: ISTAT. Surface: geographical surface expressed in kilo-
meters squared. Source: ISTAT. Coast: dummy variable taking the value of 1 if the municipality is on the
coast. Source: ISTAT. Family: average number of people per family. Source: ISTAT. Foreigners: number
of non-italian residents as a share of total population. Source: ISTAT. Commuters: number of working
commuters as a share of total population. Source: ISTAT.Head: dummy variable taking the value of 1 if the
municipality is the political head of a province. Source: ISTAT. Buildings19: share of buildings built before
1919. Source: ISTAT. Buildings45: share of buildings built before 1945. Source: ISTAT. Buildings61:
share of buildings built before 1961. Source: ISTAT. Buildings71: share of buildings built before 1971.
Source: ISTAT. Buildings81: share of buildings built before 1981. Source: ISTAT. Buildings91: share of
buildings built before 1991. Source: ISTAT. Buildingspost91: share of buildings built after 1919. Source:
ISTAT.
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E List of municipalities in control and treatment group
Prov. of Chieti - control: Chieti (V), Fara Filiorum Petri (V), Filetto (V), San Giovanni Teatino (V), Villa
Santa Maria (V). Prov. of L’Aquila - control: Campo di Giove (V), Sulmona, Canistro (V), Cansano (V),
Anversa degli Abruzzi (V), Prezza (V), Pacentro (V), Tagliacozzo (V), Magliano de’ Marsi (V), Vittorito
(V), Ortona dei Marsi (V), Scanno (V), Roccacasale (V), Rocca Pia (V), San Benedetto dei Marsi (V),
Avezzano (V), Gioia dei Marsi (V), Lecce nei Marsi (V), Pettorano sul Gizio (V), Massa d’Albe (V), Opi
(V), Introdacqua (V), Raiano (V), Pescina (V), Calascio (V), Collepietro (V-VI), Aielli (V-VI), Secinaro
(V-VI), Molina Aterno (V-VI), Pratola Peligna (V-VI), Celano (V-VI), Scurcola Marsicana (V-VI), Cerchio
(V-VI), San Benedetto in Perillis (V-VI), Corfinio (V-VI). Prov. of L’Aquila - treatment: Acciano
(VI), Barete (VI), Barisciano (VI), Bugnara (VI), Cagnano Amiterno (VI), Campotosto (VI), Capestrano
(VI), Capitignano (VI), Caporciano (VI), Castel del Monte (VI), Castelvecchio Calvisio (VI), Cocullo (VI),
Collarmele (VI), Fagnano Alto (VI), Fontecchio (VI), Gagliano Aterno (VI), Montereale (VI), Navelli (VI),
Ocre (VI), Ofena (VI), Ovindoli (VI), Pizzoli (VI), Rocca di Cambio (VI), Rocca di Mezzo (VI), San Pio
delle Camere (VI), Scoppito (VI), Tornimparte (VI), Villa Santa Lucia degli Abruzzi (VI), Carapelle Calvisio
(VI-VII), Castel di Ieri (VI-VII), Lucoli (VI-VII), Prata d’Ansidonia (VI-VII), San Demetrio ne’ Vestini
(VI-VII), Santo Stefano di Sessanio (VI-VII), Castelvecchio Subequo (VII), Goriano Sicoli (VII), Tione degli
Abruzzi (VII), Fossa (VII-VIII), L’Aquila (VIII-IX), Poggio Picenze (VIII-IX), Sant’Eusanio Forconese (IX),
Villa Sant’Angelo (IX). Prov. of Pescara - control: Bolognano (V), Catignano (V), Cepagatti (V),
Civitaquana (V), Corvara (V), Farindola (V), Loreto Aprutino (V), Manoppello (V), Nocciano (V), Penne
(V), Pescosansonesco (V), Rosciano (V), Scafa (V), Vicoli (V), Villa Celiera (V), Alanno (V-VI), Carpineto
della Nora (V-VI), Castiglione a Casauria (V-VI), Pianella (V-VI), Pietranico (V-VI), Tocco da Casauria (V-
VI). Prov. of Pescara - treatment: Brittoli (VI), Bussi sul Tirino (VI), Civitella Casanova (VI), Cugnoli
(VI), Montebello di Bertona (VI), Popoli (VI), Torre de’ Passeri (VI). Prov. of Teramo - control: Bisenti
(V), Cellino Attanasio (V), Cortino (V), Crognaleto (V), Rocca Santa Maria (V), Teramo (V), Torricella
Sicura (V), Valle Castellana (V), Basciano (V-VI), Castel Castagna (V-VI), Cermignano (V-VI), Isola del
Gran Sasso d’Italia (V-VI). Prov. of Teramo - treatment: Arsita (VI), Castelli (VI), Colledara (VI),
Fano Adriano (VI), Montorio al Vomano (VI), Penna Sant’Andrea (VI), Pietracamela (VI), Tossicia (VI).
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F Descriptive statistics and complementary figures
Table 12: Distribution of Mercalli ranks across provinces in 2009.
Mercalli rank Chieti L’Aquila Pescara Teramo Total
0 99 31 18 27 175
V 4 25 15 8 52
V-VI 1 10 6 4 21
VI 0 28 7 8 43
VI-VII 0 6 0 0 6
VII 0 3 0 0 3
VII-VIII 0 1 0 0 1
VIII 0 0 0 0 0
VIII-IX 0 2 0 0 2
IX 0 2 0 0 2
Total 104 108 46 47 305
Figure 6: Output change - Lights intensity change.
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Table 14: Summary Statistics (regression sample)
All Control (V and V-VI) Treatment (VI and VI-VII)
Variable Mean St. Dev. Min Max Mean St. Dev. Min Max Mean St. Dev. Min Max
GDP 13,274 6,472 4,915 77,014 13,342 5,263 6357 47,128 12,962 4,277 6,414 27,227
Total income 13,106 2,237 7,582 21,454 13,119 2,354 7970 19,934 13,201 2,503 7,582 20,468
Business income 334 734 0 8,252 352 609 6 32,06 105 86 0 450
Night lights intensity 16.1 12.4 1.9 62.3 15.0 10.8 1.9 60.0 9.7 5.0 3.2 29.4
Grants 534 1,019 0 21,300 439 727 0 14,054 990 1341 33 9,313
Local expenditure 1,748 1,873 77 25,954 1,594 1,876 77 25,754 2,476 2,006 559 15,674
Local tax revenues 1,955 643 868 7,149 1,927 759 1003 4,096 2,236 775 890 5,160
Population 4,301 10,589 77 123,077 4,778 10,085 120 56,127 1,460 1,522 141 8,283
Pop under 14 12.3 3.0 1.3 26.5 12.5 2.8 1.3 21.3 10.9 3.2 2.1 18.7
Pop over 65 26.6 9.4 7.3 86.4 26.3 8.5 11.9 63.0 30.6 10.2 12.8 67.3
Unemployment 10.1 3.8 0 28.8 10.5 3.8 4.5 23.2 10.2 3.5 0 23.0
Left 50.4 13.1 5.6 91.4 50.0 12.7 15.6 91.4 51.5 12.5 21.8 79.0
Distance⇤ 45.9 21.8 2.5 95.2 33.2 10.9 6.7 70.9 21.7 10.4 2.7 40.5
Index of damages⇤ 0.07 0.20 0 1.40 0.02 0.09 0 0.64 0.27 0.27 0.01 1.06
No. of observations 3,050 730 430
⇤refers to 2009 only.
Other statistics availble upon request.
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Table 13: Distribution of Mercalli ranks across years.
Mercalli 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 Total
0 136 160 172 246 247 305 305 175 305 305 2,356
I 3 96 82 58 48 0 0 0 0 0 287
II 3 10 8 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 23
II-III 4 6 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 13
III 10 10 4 0 5 0 0 0 0 0 29
III-IV 29 16 12 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 60
IV 44 2 9 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 56
IV-V 54 4 10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 68
V 22 1 4 0 0 0 0 52 0 0 79
V-VI 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 21 0 0 22
VI 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 43 0 0 43
VI-VII 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 6 0 0 6
VII 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 0 3
VII-VIII 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1
VIII 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
VIII-IX 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 2
IX 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 2
Total 305 305 305 305 305 305 305 305 305 305 3,050
Note: Mercalli ranks before 2009 refer to the following events: ’Subappennino Dauno’ (November 1st 2002, magnitude 5.72, epicenter in ’Molise’ region),
’Zona Ascoli Piceno’ (May 25th 2003, magnitude 4.30, epicenter in ’Marche’ region), ’Molise’ (June 1st 2003, magnitude 4.66, epicenter in ’Molise’
region), ’Monti dei Frentani’ (December 30th 2003, magnitude 4.63, epicenter in ’Molise’ region), ’Monti Tiburtini’ (October 5th 2004, magnitude 4.05,
epicenter in ’Lazio’ region), ’Zona Teramo’ (December 9th 2004, magnitude 4.54, epicenter in ’Abruzzo’ region), ’Monti dei Frentani’ (March 1st 2005,
magnitude 4.24, epicenter ’Marche’ region), ’Maceratese’ (April 12th 2005, magnitude 4.24, epicenter in ’Marche’ region), ’Valle del Topino’ (December
15th 2005, magnitude 4.69, epicenter in ’Marche’ region), ’Maceratese’ (April 10th 2006, magnitude 4.55, epicenter ’Marche’ region), and ’Promontorio
del Gargano’ (May 29th 2006, magnitude 4.92, epicenter in ’Puglia’ region).
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Figure 7: Index of damages - Mercalli ranks.
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Figure 8: Index of damages - distance.
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Figure 9: Discontinuity in expenditures (bandwidth 0.2).
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Figure 10: Discontinuity in tax revenues (bandwidth 0.2).
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Figure 11: Map of Italian regions.
45
Figure 12: Map of night lights intensity (average of 2007).
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